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RECENT DECISIONS
consistent with principles of equity.31 As a general proposition, recovery
by an insured has been limited to his actual interest in the property
destroyed thereby indemnifying him for his actual loss sustained. Until
passage of title and acquisition of the property by the condemnor it
would appear that the interest of the owner in the main case was suffi-
cient to sustain a full recovery under the policy.
JOHaN A. FORMELLA
Labor Law - Equity - Specific Performance of Arbitration
Agreements-Plaintiff union was the duly selected bargaining
agent of the employees of the defendant company. The union and
company had a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance
procedure clause which provided for the submission of any grievance
to arbitration, should all preliminary methods of settling the dispute fail.
In violation of the bargaining agreement, a union member and employee
of the defendant was refused re-employment after a leave of absence.
After all preliminary negotiations failed, a plaintiff invoked the arbitra-
tion clause of their contract but defendant refused to take part in any
arbitration of the matter. In a resulting declaratory judgment action
brought by plaintiff, the court found a dispute existed and also that
there was a valid arbitration agreement in force; this was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.' Thereafter, plaintiff brought an
action in equity for the specific performance of this arbitration clause.
Held: Specific performance denied. Agreements between employees
and employers for the arbitration of labor disputes are valid but unen-
forceable in equity. Local 1111 of the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609,
49 N.W. 2d 720 (1951).
The decsion in the principal case is apparently one of first impression
in Wisconsin. 2 The result is, however, in accord with a long line of
decisions which are thought to have found their origin in a dictum of
Lord Coke in 1609.3 Since that time courts have quite uniformly held
31 See collected cases, 29 Am. JUR. INSURANCE § 1195.
1 Local 1111, U.E.W. et al. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 255 Wis. 613, 39 N.W. 2d 740
(1949).
2 Earlier Wisconsin cases usually cited as dealing with arbitration agreements
actually involve appraisals. See Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 454 (1868);
Schneider v. Reed, 123 Wis. 488, 101 N.W. 682 (1904); Kipp v. Laum, 146
Wis. 591, 131 N.W. 418 (1911); Depies-Heus Oil Co. v. Sielaff, 246 Wis. 36,
16 N.W. 2d 386 (1944). "An 'arbitration' presupposes a controversy or dif-
ference to be decided and the arbitrators proceed in a judicial way. On the
other hand, an appraisal or valuation is generally a mere auxiliary feature
of a contract of sale, the purpose of which is not to adjudicate a contro-
versy but to avoid one." BLACK's LAw DicrioNARY, 128 (3rd ed., 1933). Un-
der the common law, appraisals are governed by different rules than are
arbitrations. 6 WLsToN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 1921 A (rev. ed., 1938);
STURGES, COmmERCIAL ARBrraaior AND AwARDs, 18-42 (1930).
a Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 80 a, 816 (1609).
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that equity will not specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate future
disputes.' The rationale of these decisions is found in the common law
character of arbitration contracts. Although considered to be valid, they
were held to be revocable by either party at any time prior to a valid
award.- Either party was believed to have the power to break the
agreement, though he might thereby render himself liable in nominal
damages at least. Clearly an equitable decree ordering an arbitration
could be made nugatory by either party exercising this power. In addi-
tion to this theory of revocability, the courts were probably also in-
fluenced by the idea that such agreements tended to oust the courts of
their jurisdiction.- There have been some decisions to the contrary,7
but the court in the principal case has reached a conclusion in accord
with the majority of decisions. The court did not reach its decision,
however, by adopting the common law rule. Instead, it felt compelled
to reach this conclusion because of existing Wisconsin statutes.
In 1931, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a statute which made
commercial arbitration agreements specifically enforceable but expressly
excepted labor agreements. Why the legislature made this exception is
not clear. A search of the 1931 session laws discloses no statement of
policy which would clarify the statute. The session laws do reveal,
however, several statutes passed at the same session which could only
be construed as sympathetic to the cause of labor.9 These latter enact-
ments clearly indicate a legislative state of mind favoring liberal pro-
4Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Storey 800,825 (C.C. Mass., 1845). RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS, § 550, comment a (1932); cf. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtog Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir., 1942). STUGRES, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, 83, n. 106 (1930).
5 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. RE'v.
160, 161-164 (1934). U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co. 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y., 1915). See Park Construction Co. v. School Dist.
No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475, 135 A.L.R. 59 (1941) (Dissenting
Opinion). Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE
L. J. 595 (1928).
6 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, supra, note 5.See note, 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941).
8 WIS. STATS. (1931), Sec. 298.01. "A provision in any written contract to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, ...
shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract; provided however,
that the provisions of this chapter shall not apply between employers and
employes, or between employers and associations of employes."
9 See Wis. Laws (1931) c. 376. This chapter prohibits so-called "Yellow-dog"
contracts, delineates lawful conduct in labor disputes, etc. The public policy
as to collective bargaining is declared in this chapter as follows: "Negotia-
tion of terms and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement
between employer and employes . . . it is necessary that the individual
workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and the desig-
nation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa-
tion of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purchase of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection."
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labor legislation. Considering this attitude, it would seem to be a non
sequitur to say this legislature felt public policy to be opposed to labor
agreements. The reason for this exclusion clause in the arbitration
statute must lie elsewhere.
The so-called Draft State Arbitration Act 0 which was proposed by
the American Arbitration Association has served as a model for many
state statutes." Wisconsin's arbitration statute is also patterned on this
draft, and there are several striking similarities of phraseology between
the two. The Draft State Act contains an exclusion clause similar to
that of the Wisconsin statute, the wording being almost identical. 2
Considering the pro-labor attitude of the legislature which enacted sec-
tion 298.01, it seems quite probable that the reason the exclusion clause
appears in this statute is that it was in the model from which the Wis-
consin law was drafted. This being the case, it would appear that no
legislative intention as to invalidation of labor arbitration agreements
could be validly drawn from the clause. In the principal case, the court
interprets section 298.01 as declaring a public policy against specific
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes and holds that
it has no power to order arbitration without an express legislative au-
thorization. Justice Currie in his dissenting opinion, takes the view that
the basic public policy favors their enforcement, and unless expressly
prohibited, the court should enforce such agreements. After considering
the attitude on labor problems of that 1931 legislature as shown by its
other labor enactments of the same session, the dissent seems to be more
correct in its view of the basic public policy.
In 1939, Chapter 111 was added to the Wisconsin statutes by
Chapter 57 of the session laws. This "Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act" created an administrative agency (the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board) to deal with labor relations, including breaches of
agreements to arbitrate labor disputes.'3 Cases involving this question
are occupying an ever-increasing amount of the Board's time. Illus-
trative of its attitude on this issue is the WERB's decision in the
International Association of Machinists v. Wausaw Motor Parts Co.14
10 STURGES, COMIMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, 977 (1930).
11 Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv.
160, 161 (1934).
12 Compare W'Is. STATs. (1931), Sec. 298.01, "... provided however, that the
provisions of this chapter shall not apply between employers and employes,
or between employers and associations of employes," with DRAFT STATE
ARBITRATION AcT, Sec. 2, ". . . provided however, that the provisions of this
act shall not apply to collective contracts between employers and employees,
or between employers and associations of employees, in respect to terms or
conditions of employment."
33 WIS. STATS. (1939), Sec. 111.06 "(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer individually or in concert with others:. . . (f) To violate the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement (including an agreement to accept
an arbitration award)"
14 Case I, No. 1463 Ce-206 Decision No. 1388 (1947).
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There, the defendant employer refused to arbitrate a dispute which was
in violation of his agreement. The plaintiff union took the case before
the WERB which held: The employer's refusal to arbitrate was a viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement and was contrary to section
111.06 (1) (f). The Board then ordered the employer to:
"(a) Immediately submit to a Board of Arbitration as provided
for in Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement now in
effect between complainant union and respondent employer."
This holding is on all fours with the principal case and seems to indicate
that had the plaintiff there brought his complaint before the WERB it
would have prevailed.
The court, in the principal case, apparently grounds its decision on
the idea that the legislature by its re-enactment of section 298.01 in the
closing paragraph of Chapter 57,15 intended thereby to continue the
common law rule against the enforcement of labor arbitration agree-
ments by the courts. As stated above, it is questionable that this was
the legislative intention. Prior to this re-enactment in 1939, the section
provided in effect, that all arbitration agreements are valid and enforce-
able, except those dealing with labor disputes. The legislature by this
1939 enactment, merely added the phrase, "except as provided in section
111.10 of the statutes."'a From this it would appear that the more
plausible construction of the legislative intent of the 1939 Session would
be, that by section 298.01, non-labor arbitration agreements are enforce-
able by the courts; and by section 111.10, labor agreements are enforce-
able by the WERB notwithstanding section 111.07.-7
Whether this delegation of exclusive power to the WERB is the best
solution to the question is perhaps debatable. However, among other
reasons,.8 there is clearly merit to the position that the WERB can give
labor-management problems more expeditious and specialized con-
sideration. WILLIAM F. DONOVAN
15 Wis. Laws (1939), c. 57.
16WIs. STATS. (1939), sec. 111.10. "Parties to a labor dispute may agree in
writing to have the board act or name arbitrators in all or any part of such
dispute, and thereupon the board shall have the power so to act. The board
shall appoint as arbitrators only competent, impartial and disinterested per-
sons. Proceedings in any such arbitration shall be as provided in chapter
298 of the statutes."
17 WIs. STATS. (1939), see. 111.07. "(1) Any controversy concerning unfair labor
practices may be submitted to the board in the manner and with the effect
provided in this chapter, but nothing herein shall prevent the pursuit of legal
or equitable relief in courts of competent jurisdiction." Since agreements to
arbitrate were apparently unenforceable at common law, the 1931 legislature
must not have intended this saving clause to apply to section 111.10 if the
court in the principal case is correct in its holding that such agreements are
also unenforceable under section 298.01. If, however, the legislature did
intend this clause to apply to section 111.10 then it would seem it did not in-
tend to exclude labor agreements from the arbitration statute, as this is the
only other remedy available save a grossly inadequate remedy of damages.
18 Rice, A Paradox of our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 237 (1951).
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